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INTRODUCTION
Currently, women account for approximately 15.7% of legislators
worldwide.1 Out of 184 countries, only seventeen (approximately
∗
J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, 2005; B.A.
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Professor Mary Clark, Alicia Kolar Prevost, Beth Roma, Nadia Zakir, and Journal staff.
1. See INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, WORLD
AVERAGES (revealing regional differences in that women occupy 39.9% of
parliamentary seats in Nordic countries, but occupy less than 20% of such seats in
every other world region), at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm (last modified
Feb. 28, 2005).
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nine percent) possess a critical mass of at least thirty percent female
parliamentarians.2 Many of these seventeen countries utilize some
form of “positive discrimination” mechanism or gender quota to
increase women’s political representation.3
The three primary types of gender quotas are constitutional quotas,
election law quotas, and party level quotas.4 Much gender quota
literature focuses on constitutional or party level quotas that require a
specified percentage of female candidates on party lists or that
prohibit more than a certain percentage of candidates of one gender
per party list.5 This Comment focuses on the United States
Democratic Party’s party level quotas.6 According to the Democratic
Party’s Equal Division Rule, “[t]he National Convention shall be
composed of delegates equally divided between men and women.”7
Equal division rules, like the one set forth by the Democratic Party,
are more facially progressive than gender quotas, which require only
that women serve as candidates for office.8 Implementation of
2. See id. (listing countries possessing at least thirty percent female
parliamentarians in a lower or single house: Rwanda (48.8%), Sweden (45.3%),
Norway (38.2%), Finland (37.5%), Denmark (36.9%), Netherlands (36.7%), Cuba
(36%), Spain (36%), Costa Rica (35.1%), Mozambique (34.8%), Belgium (34.7%),
Austria (33.9%), Argentina (33.7%), South Africa (32.8%), Germany (32.8%),
Guyana (30.8%), and Iceland (30.2%)); see also Joni Lovenduski, Women & Politics:
Minority Representation or Critical Mass?, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 743, 744 (2001)
(acknowledging thirty percent as the critical mass or level that enables female
legislators to effectively create and promote policy objectives). But see Susan Roth,
Women of the Senate Come into Their Own as Their Numbers Grow, GANNETT NEWS
SERV., TABLE 6, July 6, 2003 (arguing that female Senators in the United States
currently enjoy the ability to influence policymaking despite the fact they do not
numerically constitute a critical mass).
3. See PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 191 (Cambridge U. Press 2004) (distinguishing between statutory gender
quotas, voluntary gender quotas, and reserved seats).
4. See INT’L IDEA & STOCKHOLM U., GLOBAL DATABASE OF QUOTAS FOR WOMEN
(defining constitutional quotas as provisions established in a country’s constitution,
election law quotas as provisions established in the regulations or national legislation
of a country, and party level quotas as political party measures used to ensure a
percentage
of
female
candidates
or
female
party
leaders),
at
http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutQuotas.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
5. See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 3, at 192-98 (summarizing the various affirmative
action measures implemented in Europe, Latin America, and Africa to increase
women’s political representation).
6. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., THE CHARTER AND BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, art. II, § 4 (as amended Jan. 19, 2002) [hereinafter
DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER] (requiring gender-balanced state delegations at national
conventions), available at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/ charter.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005).
7. See id. at art. VII, § 6 (mandating that equal division of delegate and
committee positions fails to breach the Party’s nondiscrimination policy).
8. See Miki Caul, Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender
Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis, 63 J. POL. 1214, 1226 (2001) (asserting that parties
may adopt candidate quotas to superficially demonstrate their adherence to gender
equality).
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gender quotas does not automatically guarantee the election of
women.9 Theoretically, political parties could place women in the
lowest available spots on party lists, thus minimizing their chances of
winning office despite the parties’ official compliance with the gender
quota.10 Equal division rules, on the other hand, like reserved seats,
guarantee women half of the available slots in institutions.11
This Comment defends the Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule
as constitutionally sound.12 Part I addresses the history of genderbalance legislation in the two major American political parties.13 Part
II examines the Equal Division Rule’s validity with regard to freedom
of association, voting rights, political question doctrine, and state
action.14 Part III discusses Equal Protection defenses of the Rule
according to gender-based discrimination and affirmative action
law.15
The successful establishment of political party gender quotas in the
United States proves remarkable in light of both the controversy
surrounding affirmative action16 and constitutional and statutory
Judicial
provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sex.17
9. See, e.g., Garance Franke-Ruta, Liberté, Egalité, Sororité, LEGAL AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 32 (noting that the French parity law requiring gender-balanced
candidate lists resulted in a mere 1.4% increase in the proportion of female
parliamentarians).
10. See, e.g., Mark P. Jones, Increasing Women’s Representation Via Gender
Quotas: the Argentine Ley de Cupos, 16 WOMEN & POL. 75, 87-88 (1996) (finding that
Argentinian parties either have disregarded quota law requirements or have complied
minimally, placing women in the lowest permissible slots).
11. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Breaking the Barriers: Positive Discrimination Policies
for Women, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89, 93-94 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds.,
2001) (noting the advantages and disadvantages of reserved seat systems, which
several countries have implemented to benefit women, ethnic groups, and religious
minorities).
12. See infra notes 71-217 and accompanying text (asserting that the Rule
withstands freedom of association, voting rights, political question, state action, and
gender-based Equal Protection scrutiny, but may falter under affirmative action
analysis).
13. See infra notes 20-70 and accompanying text (reviewing Democratic and
Republican Party initiatives intended to attract female electors and party members).
14. See infra notes 71-170 and accompanying text (concluding that the Equal
Division Rule does not violate electors’ freedom of association and voting rights).
Rather, the Rule constitutes a non-justiciable political question. Id. Alternatively, the
Rule does not involve state actors, thus precluding the validity of Equal Protection
claims targeting the Equal Division Rule. Id.
15. See infra notes 171-217 and accompanying text (arguing that proponents
should rely on gender-based classification analysis rather than affirmative action
analysis to defend the Rule).
16. See, e.g., Terry M. Neal & David S. Broder, Affirmative Action Tears at Fla.
GOP, WASH. POST, May 15, 1999, at A1 (acknowledging affirmative action as a divisive
issue among the electorate, capable of determining voters’ political affiliation).
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating states’ provision of “equal
protection of the laws” to all citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting
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deference to political parties has enabled the continued
implementation of measures requiring gender-balanced party
leadership and state delegations.18 The persistence of such measures
suggests that, in certain circumstances, courts apply a lenient level of
scrutiny, guaranteeing the preservation of benign gender
discrimination measures.19
I. THE ORIGINS OF EQUAL DIVISION RULES
A. Democratic and Republican Party Charters, Bylaws, and Rules
The Democratic and Republican Parties,20 as well as select states,21
have long required gender-balanced national or state committees.22
The Republican Party rule concerning state delegations, however, is
worded more loosely than its Democratic Party counterpart,23
potentially explaining the disproportionate number of challenges to

employment discrimination based on sex); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (barring
gender discrimination in education).
18. See, e.g., Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (applying rational basis analysis, the most deferential level of analysis, to
uphold party delegate selection formula).
19. See, e.g., Bachur v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 836 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th Cir.
1987) (upholding the Maryland Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule and
declaring that political parties’ private associational rights trump an individual’s
freedom to vote).
20. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 16 (adopting
gender-balanced national, executive, and state committees, conventions, and
commissions); REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY RULE 1
(allocating National Committee membership to one man, one woman, and the state
party chair), available at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=13 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005); REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY
RULE 5 (mandating gender-balance for National Committee Chair and Vice-Chair
positions), available at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=13 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005).
21. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 69.16A (West 2004) (ordering gender-balanced
state appointive boards, commissions, committees, and councils); MONT. CODE ANN. §
2-15-108 (2003) (requiring “positive action” to attain gender-balanced state
government boards, commissions, committees, and councils); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
21:33-a (2004) (listing gender-balance as one factor to consider in appointments to
state offices, agencies, commissions, and boards); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-06-19 (2003)
(recommending gender-balanced appointive boards, commissions, committees, and
councils).
22. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 489 (Wash. 1978) (noting that state
laws mandating gender-balanced state committee leadership originated in 1927 and
1939).
23. Compare REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY RULE
14(D) (“Each state shall endeavor to have equal representation of men and women in
its delegation to the Republican National Convention.”) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=32 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005),
with DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (“The National
Convention shall be composed of delegates equally divided between men and
women.”) (emphasis added).
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the latter.24 Nevertheless, the Republican Party’s activism in the postsuffrage era galvanized Democratic Party members and contributed to
the latter’s eventual adoption of the Equal Division Rule.25
B. Pre-Suffrage: 1895-1919
Equal division or “fifty-fifty” rules first appeared in political parties
in Colorado a full quarter-century before American women attained
full suffrage.26 In 1895, two years after Colorado women received
voting rights, the Colorado Populist Party required gender-balanced
committees, as did the Democratic Party for its county and state
central committees.27 The Colorado Democratic and Republican
Parties enacted gender-balance rules for party committees in 1906.28
In 1910, the state legislature included gender-balanced party
committees in the new primary law.29 Several other states, including
Idaho, Michigan, and Nebraska, quickly followed suit.30
As the prospect of women’s suffrage became imminent, both major
national political parties expressed an interest in equal division
rules.31 A 1919 Republican Party proposal for a gender-balanced

24. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842-43 (affirming the validity of the Democratic
Party’s Equal Division Rule); Ricard v. State, 544 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (upholding the Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule); Levine v. Millspaugh,
180 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. 1958) (permitting the Democratic State Committee’s
rules requiring gender-balanced state committees). But see In re Cavallier, 287 N.Y.S.
739, 742 (N.Y. 1936) (rejecting the Democratic Party’s requirement of genderbalanced state committees). Although this Comment focuses primarily on the
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule due to the large number of relevant cases,
conclusions apply to both political parties.
25. See generally Richard E. Matland & Donley T. Studlar, The Contagion of
Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation
Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway, 58 J. POL. 707 (1996) (proposing a “contagion
theory,” whereby a party’s adoption of gender quotas caused competing parties to
adopt similar measures to increase women’s representation).
26. See JO FREEMAN, A ROOM AT A TIME: HOW WOMEN ENTERED PARTY POLITICS 11011 (2000) (noting that the 1894 predecessor to the Colorado Equal Division Rule
called for at least one woman to sit on precinct committees). However, many county
committees refused to follow this rule. Id.
27. See id. (revealing the Populist Party’s trendsetting actions).
28. But see id. (observing that gender-balance rules did not always translate to
equal representation).
29. See id. at 111 (arguing that Colorado women’s organization and activism,
particularly in small towns across the state, enabled them to take their demand of
equal representation on party committees to the state legislature).
30. See id. (observing that the two main Idaho political parties brought equally
divided central committees to the 1898 state party convention, Michigan mandated
two men and one woman on Congressional party committees, and Nebraska required
gender-balanced district representation).
31. See KRISTI ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL
POLITICS BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 81-105 (1996) (examining the state and national
parties’ adoption, advocacy, and enforcement of “fifty-fifty” rules).
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National Committee failed;32 however, the Party agreed to increase
the number of seats on the Executive Committee from ten to fifteen,
and to recommend reserving seven of the seats for female Committee
members.33 The Democratic Party, on the other hand, successfully
adopted a proposal to double the Democratic National Committee,
thereafter including one male and one female member per state.34
Democrats, in particular, viewed women as a political resource and
Both parties publicized their
potential electoral goldmine.35
respective gender-related policies to attract women’s votes.36
C. Post-Suffrage: 1920-1950
The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, granted women full
voting rights.37 Political parties subsequently began wooing women in
earnest, seeking to double their constituencies.38 “Fifty-fifty” rules
represented one strategy parties employed to attract female voters at
both the national and state levels.39 The Republican Party became
the political trendsetter for equal division rules during the era.40 In
32. See id. at 81 (noting that the Rules Committee denied the request, despite
the fact that Republican women proposed “adequate” instead of “equal”
representation).
33. See id. at 81-82 (revealing that female Republican Party elites acquiesced to
this arrangement both to prevent the Democratic Party from using the issue for
political gain and to prove their leadership efficacy to male Republican Party elite).
34. See Committee Votes for Full Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1920, at 2
(explaining the logistics of the decision, according to which male delegates initially
elected female delegates, and thereafter, voters chose female delegates).
35. But see ANDERSEN, supra note 31, at 82 (asserting that in 1920, the Republican
Party sought to capitalize on women’s votes).
36. See App. WOMAN CITIZEN, Sept. 11, 1920, at 399 (lauding the gender-balanced
Democratic National Committee and highlighting the dearth of a similar rule in the
Republican Party); WOMAN CITIZEN, Oct. 9, 1920, at 513 (distinguishing the
Republican Party National Executive Committee as the “REAL COMMITTEE of real
power” from the comparatively powerless Democratic National Committee).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The rights of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.”). See generally VOTES FOR WOMEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUFFRAGE REVISITED
(Jean H. Baker ed., 2002) (depicting the achievement of women’s suffrage as “the
story of nation-building and citizen-making”).
38. See ANNA L. HARVEY, VOTES WITHOUT LEVERAGE: WOMEN IN AMERICAN
ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1920-1970 111-35 (1998) (detailing the Democratic and
Republican Parties’ efforts to attract female votes by establishing women’s party
organizations and emphasizing issues related to women’s domestic and maternal
duties).
39. But see CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PARTIES,
POSITIONS, AND CHANGE 26-27 (2000) (acknowledging the parties’ lax enforcement of
such rules given the small minority of women in party delegations and male
dominance in appointments to leadership positions, even within the parties’ women’s
organizations).
40. See ANDERSEN, supra note 31, at 105 (revealing that equal division rules
disproportionately benefited women with “traditional policy concerns” who were
likely to belong to the Republican Party).
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1924, the Republican Party adopted Rule 14, which permitted states
to send one man and one woman to the National Committee.41
Throughout the 1920s, the Republican Party, bolstered by its majority
presence in many state legislatures, lobbied for the passage of “fiftyfifty” statutes.42 The Party’s efforts proved successful; in 1929,
eighteen states possessed “fifty-fifty” rules at various levels in both
major political parties.43
In the 1930s, the Democratic Party took a more active role in the
fight for equal division at the behest of Molly Dewson, the head of the
Democratic National Committee’s Women’s Division.44 Dewson
perceived gender-balance requirements as the most effective
mechanism to increase women’s participation and leadership in
political parties.45 Her tactical decision to frame the issue as
providing women with opportunities, rather than limiting those of
men, and to emphasize women’s maternal responsibilities as the
justification for women’s inclusion rendered her efforts largely
successful.46 Women’s enhanced electoral power as the majority of
registered voters further spurred the drive for gender-balance party
rules.47 By 1950, only eight states lacked equal division laws or party
rules.48
Despite the prevalence of equal division rules, female party
members soon realized that such provisions provided for physical

41. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 112 (noting the rule’s demise in 1952).
42. See id. at 110-11, 115 (noting the increasing popularity of equal division laws
after Colorado’s legislative and party actions).
43. But see Emily Newell Blair, Women in the Political Parties, 143 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 223 (1929) (acknowledging that at least “some” women
became active in party organizations in states without “fifty-fifty” rules).
44. See infra App. for a political cartoon printed in DEMOCRATIC DIG., June 1935,
reprinted in Jacqueline R. Braitman, Legislated Parity: Mandating Integration of
Women into California Political Parties, 1930s-1950s, in WE HAVE COME TO STAY:
AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTIES, 1880-1960, at 174, 174 (Melanie Gustafson
et al. eds., 1999) (depicting Molly Dewson’s efforts to enhance women’s political
participation and representation).
45. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 116 (revealing that Dewson, as head of the
Women’s Division, drafted model “fifty-fifty” statutes for state party adoption).
46. See id. at 117 (attributing Dewson’s effective advocacy of “fifty-fifty” rules to
her public acceptance of “male predominance”).
47. See Marguerite J. Fisher, Women in the Political Parties, 251 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 93 (1947) (noting that male party elites accorded women
influential positions, such as Republican Party National Committee Assistant Chair
and Democratic Party National Committee Secretary, to win women’s votes).
48. See Braitman, supra note 44, at 180 (explaining women’s political advances
after World War I, as women’s war-time employment prepared them to pursue
political posts). The eight states in which parties failed to pursue “fifty-fifty” laws or
party rules were Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 178, 180.
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representation, but not effective authority.49 In fact, regardless of
their designation as “fifty-fifty” rules, the laws did not guarantee equal
representation.50
Quantitatively and qualitatively, female party
members remained second class citizens.51
D. Women’s Movement: 1960s-1970s
The advent of the second wave of the women’s movement in the
late 1960s and early 1970s highlighted women’s social, economic, and
political inequality.52 Both major political parties undertook reform
measures intended to redress women’s lackluster participation rates.53
The Democratic Commission on Delegate Selection and Party
Reform, also known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, mandated
state party action to remedy past sex discrimination and to achieve
“reasonable representation” of women as national convention
delegates.54 The reforms initially proved successful: at the 1972
national convention, women accounted for approximately forty
49. See ELISABETH ISRAELS PERRY, BELLE MOSKOWITZ: FEMININE POLITICS AND THE
EXERCISE OF POWER IN THE AGE OF ALFRED E. SMITH 195 (1987) (revealing that male
Democratic Party National Committee members selected female vice chairs without
first seeking advice from female committee members); Eunice Fuller Barnard, The
Woman Voter Gains Power, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 12, 1928, at 1-2, 20 (describing the
Republican National Committeewomen’s exclusion from a strategy meeting attended
by their male colleagues).
50. See Anna L. Harvey, Culture or Strategy? Women in New York State Parties,
1917-1930, in WE HAVE COME TO STAY: AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTIES, 18801960 87, 92-94 (Melanie Gustafson et al. eds., 1999) (noting male party leaders’
refusal to acknowledge or abide by equal division rules for Republican State and
Democratic National Committees).
51. But see Braitman, supra note 44, at 179 (contending that party rosters
identified women by their own names, rather than by their marital names, and that
women acted independently and not as pawns of male relatives or acquaintances).
52. See generally THE FEMINIST MEMOIR PROJECT: VOICES FROM WOMEN’S
LIBERATION (Rachel Blau DuPlessis & Ann Snitow eds., 1998) (addressing the
experiences, aspirations, and achievements of feminist activists during the 1960s and
1970s).
53. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 34-35 (reviewing disputes between
moderate and conservative Republicans concerning the necessity of including women
in the Party’s affirmative action efforts); Bella Abzug et al., Women in the Democratic
Party: A Review of Affirmative Action, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 3, 11-12 (1974)
(discussing the Mikulski Commission’s strategies to attract female members with
financial and educational assistance and targeted recruitment).
54. See JANET A. FLAMMANG, WOMEN’S POLITICAL VOICE: HOW WOMEN ARE
TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE AND STUDY OF POLITICS 136 (1997) (revealing that
Democratic and Republican delegates perceived gender discrimination as a
significant obstacle to women’s participation as party members, leaders, and
candidates); DENIS G. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 1972, at 17 (1974) (summarizing the McGovern-Fraser
Commission reforms, which sought to enhance the participation of AfricanAmericans, youths, and women). But see Jeane Kirkpatrick, Representation in the
American National Conventions: The Case of 1972, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 265, 275-77
(1975) (criticizing the McGovern-Fraser Commission as emphasizing diversity of
delegates rather than diversity of perspectives).
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percent of the Democratic delegation.55
The Republican Party, as well, relied on Commission investigations
and reports to formulate a party policy regarding women’s
participation at national conventions.56 The Republican Committee
on Delegations and Organizations issued a report in 1971, which the
Rules Committee later adopted, recommending states “endeavor” to
present gender-balanced delegations at the 1972 convention.57 The
proposal to include sex in Rule 32, which addressed the Party’s
commitment to use “positive action to achieve the broadest possible
participation”58 of various underrepresented groups, proved much
more contentious.59
Although the moderate party members
prevailed and oversaw the addition of sex to the rule, the lack of
enforcement provisions weakened its overall effectiveness.60 Despite
the Party’s resistance to commit to sex-based affirmative action
measures, women accounted for almost thirty percent of the delegates
at the 1972 Republican convention, almost twice the proportion
present at the previous national convention.61
The 1976 national conventions sparked continued debate
regarding women and affirmative action.62 Feminist and AfricanAmerican Democratic caucus members lobbied for an equal division
rule for state delegations after observing a decrease in the selection of
55. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 36 (comparing the 1972 convention to the
1968 convention, in which thirteen percent of the delegates were women). But see
Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 12 (asserting that the Democratic delegation at the
1972 national convention was forty-nine percent female).
56. See Jo Freeman, Whom You Know Versus Whom You Represent: Feminist
Influence in the Democratic and Republican Parties, in THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 215, 223 (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Carol
McClurg Mueller eds., 1987) (noting that Rosemary Ginn, the chair of the
Republican Committee on Delegates and Organizations, supported the National
Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC)). The NWPC championed “fifty-fifty” rules for
delegates. Id. at 222-23.
57. See id. (observing that the Republican Party National Committee declined to
specify what actions would satisfy this recommendation, instead permitting the
exercise of state party discretion).
58. TANYA MELICH, THE REPUBLICAN WAR AGAINST WOMEN: AN INSIDER’S REPORT
FROM BEHIND THE LINES 25-26 (1996).
59. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 34-44 (acknowledging the dispute as one of
many between moderate and conservative party members); MELICH, supra note 58, at
26 (noting that Rule 32 encompassed women, youth, minority and “heritage” groups,
and senior citizens).
60. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 38 (contrasting the Republican regulation
with similar Democratic measures permitting delegates to hold the party accountable
for inadequate gender representation).
61. See PAUL ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 286 (7th
ed. 1992) (categorizing the percentage of female delegates at party conventions
between 1968 and 1988).
62. See Freeman, supra note 56, at 228 (noting that Democratic feminists focused
on achieving a “fifty-fifty” rule at the 1976 convention).
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female delegates when compared with the previous delegation.63
Then-Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter’s opposition to fifty-fifty
rules for delegates in 1976 prevented their establishment; however,
Carter mollified feminist activists by promising to endorse equal
division in the future and to increase the opportunities for women in
the Democratic Party, his presidential campaign, and his
administration.64
Unlike their Democratic counterparts, whose advocacy of equal
division in 1976 conclusively demonstrated their influence within the
Party,65 Republican feminists seeking greater participation of women
received rebukes for attempting to “McGovernize” the party by
requiring gender quotas.66 Nevertheless, the proportion of female
Republican delegates increased slightly to thirty-six percent, while that
of female Democratic delegates decreased to thirty-four percent.67
In 1978, in time for the mid-term convention, the Democratic Party
established the Equal Division Rule, mandating gender-balanced
delegations at national conventions.68 Continued feminist advocacy
and the death of AFL-CIO President George Meaney, an outspoken
quota foe, contributed to the party’s adoption of the “fifty-fifty” rule,
almost sixty years after the Democratic National Committee first
considered the proposal.69 The rule remains in effect today.70

63. See id. (asserting that midway through the process, election of AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, young, and female delegates in 1976 lagged fifteen to thirty-five
percent behind the 1972 count).
64. See Mary L. Clark, Changing the Face of the Law: How Women’s Advocacy
Groups Put Women on the Federal Judicial Appointments Agenda, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 243, 243-52 (2002) (revealing President Carter’s precedent-setting
appointment of women to the federal judiciary). During his four years in office,
President Carter appointed forty women to federal courts, five times as many as all
prior presidential appointments. Id. at 245.
65. See Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican
Parties, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 327, 341 (1986) (arguing that Democratic feminist leaders
lost the equal division battle but ultimately won the war by proving their efficacy,
organization, and determination).
66. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 41 (observing that female Party members’
protests at the convention resulted in the weakening of the Republican rule
prohibiting discriminatory delegate selection).
67. See Freeman, supra note 56, at 228 (contending that the decrease in female
delegates from 1972 to 1976 renewed support for the “50-50 rule,” which the
Democratic Party adopted in 1978).
68. See id. at 229 (noting that around the time the Equal Division Rule passed,
women accounted for more than half of the Democratic electorate).
69. See id. (observing that Carter’s staffers yielded the fight upon relentless
feminist activism).
70. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (requiring
gender-balanced state delegations at national conventions).
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II. DOCTRINAL CHALLENGES TO THE EQUAL DIVISION RULE
A. Freedom of Association
Political parties enjoy broad First Amendment protections,
including freedoms of speech and association.71 This freedom of
association encompasses a person’s right to associate with a party,72 a
party’s right to determine standards for membership,73 and the party
and members’ right to choose candidates to represent the party.74
Courts generally respect parties’ autonomy and do not require parties
to treat all voters and party members equally.75
Nevertheless, prospective Democratic Party delegates could allege
that the Equal Division Rule infringes upon their ability to “peaceably
. . . assemble” at conventions by arbitrarily restricting their attendance
as delegates at the convention.76
However, such freedom of
association challenges of the Equal Division Rule will likely prove
fruitless.77
Courts generally interpret freedom of association
allegations broadly, assessing the impact of the rule at issue on the
organization’s ability to further its overall mission.78 Just as courts
have held that the admission of women members will not
detrimentally affect, but in fact, may enhance private service
organizations’ goals,79 so too will enforcing parity among male and

71. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (linking the right to unite
to promote political ideas with the freedom to associate with a preferred political
party).
72. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (proclaiming the freedom to
assemble and endorse political views as one of “our most precious freedoms”).
73. See Democratic Party v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)
(deducing freedom to limit party membership as inherent in parties’ freedom to
associate).
74. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 601 n.9 (Tamm, J., concurring) (explaining that
although delegates select the nominee, ballot inclusion occurs only after state party
certification).
75. See id. at 583-84 (noting that parties restrict voters’ ability to select delegates
to various conventions and grant automatic delegate status to certain party officials).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the
right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
224 (1989) (asserting that the First Amendment protects political parties’ processes
for selecting party leaders).
78. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)
(holding that requiring California Rotary Clubs to accept women members fails to
infringe on the Club’s right of association or to impact the Club’s public service
goals); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (noting that
admission of women as members fails to prevent the Jaycees from achieving their
political and social objectives).
79. See Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548-49 (positing that the Rotary Club’s admission
of female members will enhance the organization’s community service capabilities).
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female delegates further the Democratic Party’s objectives.80 In
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, the Court
required Rotary Clubs to admit women members, observing that
expanding the membership base would strengthen the organization’s
productivity.81 Similarly, requiring gender-balanced delegations at
national conventions advances Democratic Party goals of equality,
justice, and democracy by providing male and female party members
the ability to directly participate in the political process.82 As long as
courts continue to grant parties expansive associational rights,
freedom of association challenges of party procedures stand little
chance of success.
B. Voting Rights
Democratic Party members have challenged the Equal Division
Rule as an infringement of their voting rights.83 Courts acknowledge
the right to vote as a fundamental right reflective of the liberties
enjoyed in a democratic nation.84 This right extends to primary
elections.85 The significance of the right to freely cast one’s ballot has
led courts to apply strict scrutiny to alleged state interference with
electoral processes; thus, courts frequently strike down statutes as
encroaching upon political party liberties.86 As the Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed, the extension of First Amendment protections to
political parties largely insulates them from state regulation.87 Unlike
80. See Marchioro, 582 P.2d at 494 (concluding that equal division of party
leadership positions does not substantially burden party members’ abilities to pursue
party goals).
81. Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 549 (noting that admitting female members would
provide Rotary Clubs with “a more representative cross section of community leaders
with a broadened capacity for service”).
82. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 17 (outlining the
Democratic Party Credo); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975)
(asserting that convention delegates perform a “task of supreme importance” in
selecting the parties’ Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates).
83. See, e.g., Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 666 F. Supp. 763, 769 (Md. 1987)
(arguing that the Equal Division Rule violated Bachur’s right to vote for delegates to
the national convention), rev’d, Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th
Cir. 1987).
84. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (heralding the right to vote as
“the essence of a democratic society”); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886) (lauding the right to vote as “preservative of all rights”).
85. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (identifying primary
elections as essential to the electoral process of electing members of Congress).
86. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986)
(using strict scrutiny analysis to reject Connecticut’s closed primary statute as beyond
the state’s delegated authority to control the “times, places, and manner” of
elections).
87. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (commending
political parties’ “special” First Amendment protections regarding member selection
of nominees).
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state statutes, party regulations receive the most deferential judicial
analysis.88 Therefore, party actions may trump the right to vote,
which, although fundamental, is not absolute.89
Thus, participants in the delegate selection process possess
restricted voting rights.90
The Supreme Court has failed to
definitively apply the one person, one vote standard to national
nominating conventions.91 Furthermore, while no circuit courts have
ruled affirmatively in the matter, two appellate courts have explicitly
rejected such claims.92 In Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican
Party, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the one person, one vote
standard failed to uniformly apply to all elections,93 and noted that
such a rule contradicted the less-than-democratic governing style of
political parties.94 In Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, the
Eighth Circuit, reiterating judicial reluctance to interfere with
internal party matters, refrained from applying the one person, one
vote standard to district, county, and state party conventions.95
Even if a court concluded that equal division rules infringed upon
electors’ voting rights, the court could still find such limitations
permissible.96 As the Fourth Circuit acknowledged in Bachur v.
88. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (approving, under rational basis analysis,
the Democratic Party’s use of gender-balanced delegations to enhance women’s
participation in national conventions); Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (upholding,
based on rational basis analysis, the Republican Party’s delegate selection procedure,
which awarded “victory bonuses” to states based on their electoral results).
89. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 580 (cautioning against blind reliance on the
“one person, one vote” standard and asserting that constitutional guarantees of
representation hinge on the governmental entity at issue).
90. See Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1088 n.40-41
(11th Cir. 1983) (articulating the limited scope of the one person, one vote standard,
which is inapplicable in state judicial elections, “special purpose assemblies,” state
constitutional conventions, and, in certain circumstances, party nominating
conventions).
91. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483 n.4 (declining to broaden the scope of inquiry
beyond the determination of whether state law or party rules establish delegate
qualification for participation in the national convention).
92. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 578-87 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires only that the representational system further
a legitimate party interest); see also Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d
119, 119-21 (8th Cir. 1968) (refusing to strike a party rule allowing selection of
national convention delegates from malapportioned districts).
93. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 579-80 (observing the inapplicability of the one
person, one vote standard to state judiciary elections and various special assemblies).
94. See id. at 580-85 (recognizing the inherent inequity of various party
institutions, including the electoral college, the National Committee, and party
caucuses and conventions).
95. See Irish, 399 F.2d at 120 (limiting judicial examination of the one person,
one vote standard to precinct level elections).
96. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841-42 (distinguishing voting for delegates from
voting for candidates and noting that parties may restrict an elector’s participation or
discontinue the use of primaries altogether).
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Democratic National Party, parties retain the right to determine
delegate selection methods and to implement party rules that dilute
electors’ votes.97
The judiciary’s relative leniency towards political parties,98
combined with parties’ ability to dictate delegate selection
procedure,99 indicate that equal division rules do not infringe upon
party members’ voting rights.100 Such rules constitute internal party
decisions judicially recognized as within the scope of party
authority.101 Generally, as long as parties ensure that elections are
conducted in a fair, impartial manner, they will fulfill their obligation
to rationally promote legitimate party goals.102
The establishment and implementation of gender-balanced
delegations fails to detrimentally affect the integrity of delegate
elections.103 Ballots list delegate candidates by sex, and instruct voters
to select equal numbers of male and female delegates.104 States enjoy
the discretion to determine how to treat ballots that fail to conform to
the Equal Division Rule requirements.105 To ensure party members’
97. See id. at 842 (explaining that many states employ means other than
primaries to select convention delegates, and that electors’ and delegates’ votes do
not unilaterally control the selection of the party’s presidential candidate).
98. Compare Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (holding that parties’ delegate
selection formulas must merely “rationally advance” a “legitimate” party objective to
withstand judicial scrutiny), with Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 (using heightened scrutiny
to strike a Connecticut statute requiring registered party members to choose
delegates in primary elections).
99. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (employing the rational basis standard to uphold
Maryland’s Equal Division Rule, despite its encroachment on an individual’s right to
vote for the delegate of his choice). The court held that the Rule’s representational
scheme rationally advanced the legitimate state interest in “stimulat[ing] greater
female participation” within the Democratic Party. Id.
100. See id. at 841-42 (reasoning that no infringement exists because the right to
vote for a delegate is far removed from the fundamental right to vote in elections for
candidates for public office).
101. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229, 231 (accepting parties’ rights to determine electoral
procedures and candidate selection while acknowledging that states may intervene to
protect electoral fairness). But see Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781
(1974) (holding that states may mandate party primaries); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 760-62 (1973) (permitting states to require party registration before
primaries to discourage party raiding, whereby non-party members register to
influence primary results); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (concluding
that states may restrict candidate participation to those with “a significant modicum of
support”).
102. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 588 (upholding a Republican Party formula
providing “victory bonuses” based on state party electoral performance as properly
furthering the Party’s goal of political success).
103. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 (permitting state involvement in internal party
matters only when necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral system).
104. See Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Democrats Lose in Court; Sex-Based
Delegate Selection Struck Down, WASH. POST, July 30, 1987, at D1 (explaining the
Equal Division Rule ballot procedure).
105. Telephone Interview with Alicia Kolar Prevost, Deputy Director, Party Affairs
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voting rights, parties could collect all ballots, tabulate results, and
then award the top female and male vote selections the delegate
positions.106 This option, however, provides little incentive for voters
to comply with the Equal Division Rule; those who either innocently
or deliberately ignore the Rule may not be penalized. The Equal
Division Rule and its objectives, then, are rendered toothless.107 A
more stringent alternative might involve parties’ discarding ballots
that fail to comply with the Equal Division Rule.108
It is unlikely that a disgruntled voter could successfully challenge
the Democratic Party’s decision to disregard ballots that do not act in
accord with Equal Division Rule requirements. Courts apply a
deferential test to a party’s allocation formula, generally guaranteeing
the validity of the policy.109 To withstand scrutiny, parties need only
provide “legitimate justifications” for formulas that produce
“substantial deviations from equality of voting power.”110 All voters
who comply with the ballot instructions enjoy the right to vote and
have their votes tabulated.111 If a court found that the Democratic
Party’s disregard of ballots that failed to comply with the Equal
Division Rule constituted a substantial deviation from equal voting
power,112 the court should still conclude that the Party proffered a
legitimate justification for the Rule.113 The Democratic Party’s history
of gender-based discrimination, coupled with previous fruitless
and Delegate Selection, Democratic National Committee (Oct. 14, 2003); see, e.g.,
Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (explaining that Maryland’s ballot requirements prohibit
tabulating ballots that fail to comply with the Equal Division Rule), rev’d, Bachur v.
Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987).
106. See Levine, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71 (upholding the election of a female
candidate receiving three votes). Though two male candidates received 427 and 423
votes respectively, party rules required one male and one female committee member.
Id.
107. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 23 (describing the objectives of affirmative
action as enhancing women’s participation and representation within all levels of the
party).
108. See, e.g., Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (observing that in Maryland, ballots that
do not conform with the Equal Division Rule are disregarded).
109. Compare Georgia v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (upholding parties’ allocation policies using rational basis analysis), with La
Follette, 450 U.S. at 126 (employing heightened scrutiny to reject Wisconsin’s
delegate selection method, which violated Democratic Party rules).
110. See Georgia, 447 F.2d at 1279 (upholding party formulas that did not provide
equal state delegations at conventions based on differing levels of state party
constituencies).
111. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (equating the right to cast a
ballot with the right to have one’s vote counted in both Congressional and
preliminary elections).
112. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (stating that the party would not count ballots
not in compliance with the Equal Division Rule).
113. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (concluding that the Equal Division Rule
“manifestly” satisfies rational basis analysis).
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attempts to remedy the problem,114 validate the enactment of the
Equal Division Rule.115
In general, judicial resolution of freedom of association and voting
rights challenges to the Equal Division Rule reveals the superiority of
political parties’ rights over those of individual members.116
Furthermore, parties’ interests in controlling the selection of
representatives outranks states’ interests in ensuring the integrity of
the electoral process.117 Thus, parties enjoy relative immunity from
intense judicial scrutiny when they use certain mechanisms to
determine candidate selection.118
C. Political Question Doctrine
Parties’ delegate selection methods arguably constitute nonjusticiable political questions.119 Generally, courts will refrain from
intervening in cases challenging party convention actions regarding
delegates unless the convention decision appears capricious, unfair,
or deceitful.120 Courts have further restricted this rule by reasoning
that conventions are best suited to assess the qualifications of
potential delegations.121 In formulating the Equal Division Rule, the
Democratic Party sought to remedy more than fifty years of party
discrimination against women.122 Despite previous party attempts to
114. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 4-5 (explaining the Party’s general
reluctance to assist female candidates); see also FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 110-12
(acknowledging that male party elites granted female members committee positions,
but not effective power to influence party decisions); Kirkpatrick, supra note 54, at
278 (speculating that women’s under-representation among party elite resulted not
only from party discrimination, but also from societal discrimination).
115. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (upholding the Equal Division Rule as rationally
related to achievement of the Party’s legitimate interest in electoral success and
constituency expansion).
116. See, e.g., Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Cent. Comm. v. Holm, 33 N.W.2d
831, 836-37 (Minn. 1948) (concluding that the legislature ceded control of
conventions to political parties, which exercise discretion in seating delegates).
117. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 549 (elevating the "vital" national interest of selecting
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates accomplished at national party
conventions over state interests in unilaterally determining delegate selection
procedure).
118. See, e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 230 (acknowledging parties’ discretion regarding
internal governance, structure, and activities). But see Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 588
(cautioning heightened analysis of parties’ use of invidious classifications).
119. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (describing factors that
render an issue a political question, including constitutional designation to a political
branch, unclear resolution criteria, or necessity of assistance from other branches of
government).
120. See, e.g., Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 837 (refusing jurisdiction where the state
statute granted the state central committee control over presidential electors).
121. See id. at 833-34 (classifying delegates’ rights as political rather than legal, and
generally outside the realm of judicial scrutiny).
122. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 4-5 (summarizing the poor treatment of

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/4

16

Schnall: Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Ru

2005] DEFENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY EQUAL DIVISION RULE 397
increase women’s intra-party stature,123 party leaders remained
predominantly male.124 The Rule passed only after contentious
debates, feminist activism, and the favorable recommendation of the
McGovern-Fraser Commission.125 Under such circumstances, courts
could not reasonably conclude that the Equal Division Rule reflected
capricious, unfair, or deceitful conduct.126
Could a claim alleging that the Equal Division Rule represented
gender-based political gerrymandering succeed? Courts generally
accept group complaints about voting rights based on racial and
political gerrymandering.127
In Davis v. Bandemer, Indiana
Democrats charged that a legislative reapportionment plan proposed
and passed by the Republican-dominated state legislature represented
political gerrymandering and infringed upon the Democrats’ Equal
Protection rights.128 In the first election held pursuant to the
redistricting plan, the proportion of Democrats elected to office did
not reflect—and was significantly less than, in some cases—the
proportion of votes cast for Democratic candidates.129 While finding
political gerrymandering claims, like racial claims, justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court cautioned that to have merit,
complaints must demonstrate that the structure of the electoral
women by party leaders, who relegated female candidates to hopeless races and
provided female candidates with less financial and organizational assistance than their
male counterparts).
123. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (acknowledging the party’s failure to enhance
women’s participation prior to enactment of the Equal Division Rule); WOLBRECHT,
supra note 39, at 27 (revealing that early gender-balance rules accorded women little
effective authority).
124. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 5 (denouncing the “virtual absence” of
women from Democratic leadership positions in 1968). Only one of the fifty-five state
and territorial parties, Oregon, possessed a female chairperson. Id. See also David
Niven, Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57,
61 (1998) (observing the prevalence of male party elites, who account for ninetyseven percent of party leaders in certain states).
125. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 17 (explaining the McGovern-Fraser
reforms, which required a “reasonable relationship” between the proportion of
African-Americans, women, and youth in the state population and the state party
delegation); WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 42 (describing feminist and minorities’
advocacy of “fifty-fifty” rules).
126. See Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 834 (ruling that judicial intervention will result only
where conventions act “arbitrarily, oppressively, or fraudulently” in the candidate
selection process).
127. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986) (affirming the
justiciability of cases brought pursuant to the equal protection clause that involve the
placement of district boundaries in a manner designed to affect racial or political
groups).
128. See id. at 113-15 (discussing Indiana’s legislative structure and the House and
Senate reapportionment plans).
129. See id. at 115 (noting that Democratic House candidates won 51.9% of the
vote, but only 43% of the seats, and that in two counties, Democratic House
candidates received 46.6% of the vote, but only 14% of the seats).
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system repeatedly restricts voters’ abilities to influence the political
process.130
Whereas racial and political gerrymandering plans affect all voters
in the relevant districts, the Equal Division Rule affects only those
individuals who voluntarily decide to affiliate with the Democratic
Party for the purpose of participating in primary elections.131
Furthermore, racial and political gerrymandering claims arise in the
context of direct election of candidates, while the Equal Division Rule
encompasses only the delegate—and not the candidate—selection
process, a process in which courts have traditionally proven reluctant
to intrude.132
Given that the Equal Division Rule represents an internal rule
applicable only to party affiliates voluntarily participating in primary
elections, courts should hold challenges non-justiciable.
In
Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Committee v. Holm, the
court emphasized the political nature of delegate selection
determination, refusing to intervene in an internal party dispute
involving competing groups of presidential electors.133 Similarly, in
Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Committee, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to determine the constitutionality of a local party’s
convention delegate selection procedure.134 The court found that
judicial involvement would necessitate improper policy decisions and
would fail to properly settle the matter.135 Challenges to the Equal
Division Rule implicate analogous issues of judicial encroachment in
political realms.136 Political parties, rather than the judiciary, govern
130. See id. at 132-33 (requiring “specific supporting evidence” from which the
Court may infer impermissible vote dilution).
131. See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 56-57 (heralding the right to associate oneself with a
political party as an essential constitutional liberty protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
132. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (mandating the
presentation of evidence establishing the minority challenger’s restricted ability to
elect legislators); Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841 (describing Bachur’s election of delegates
as “some steps removed” from election of “actual candidates”).
133. See Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 834 (finding political conventions best situated to
ascertain delegates’ qualifications and noting the undefined scope of judicial scrutiny
in convention matters).
134. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1080, 1086 (concluding that Wymbs’s failure to sue
the Republican Party National Committee, political parties’ broad associational rights,
and the Court’s inability to enforce the proposed “one Republican, one vote” rule
precluded judicial intervention).
135. See id. at 1083 n.28 (articulating permissible party policies as addressing party
ideology, candidate nomination, and member recruitment, particularly of
underrepresented groups such as minorities, women, and youth). The court also
noted the inability of injunctive relief to affect future conventions’ acceptance of
improperly elected delegates. Id. at 1085.
136. See id. at 1081, 1085 (stating factors relevant to justiciability determinations,
including the necessity of non-judicial policy pronouncements and the availability of
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in cases involving delegate selection disputes.137 A court’s perception
of selection methods as illogical or unreasonable does not justify
judicial intrusion into party domain.138 Suits questioning the validity
of the Equal Division Rule would require courts to assess the
suitability of internal party decisions to expand party membership and
participation, blatantly infringing on the parties’ liberty to institute
positive measures.139
Furthermore, party decisions regarding the electoral processes for
selecting candidates fail to include leeway for judicial intervention
and conflict resolution.140 Determination of damages would prove
difficult in an electoral context; had equal division rules not applied,
participants might have selected partially or entirely different
delegates.141 Ascertaining the type of damages that would sufficiently
compensate the wronged party also would prove complicated.142 If
courts award expectation damages, how should judges determine the
value of attending a national nominating convention?143 Could a
court adequately compensate individuals for the lost opportunities of
participating in a political tradition, networking with fellow delegates,
and influencing the party’s political platform?144
In addition, judicial participation in delegate elections would
require judicial intrusion into matters best left to the discretion of
more politically knowledgeable groups.145 Political branches, rather
than legal branches, determine a state’s electoral representation.146
established guidelines for adjudication).
137. See La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124 (asserting that parties’ overriding interest in
deciding delegate disputes derives from parties’ freedom of association).
138. See id. at 124 n.27 (precluding both the state legislature and judiciary from
formulating the rules that govern party members’ participation in the candidate
nomination process).
139. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (describing party efforts to attract new members
as “undeniably central” to their First Amendment liberties).
140. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (identifying political questions as those issues that
lack guidelines for judicial solutions); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 (reinforcing parties’
control over organizational structure and conduct).
141. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 840 (noting Bachur’s disinclination to reveal his
preferred set of delegates).
142. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 774 (reserving judgment on whether Bachur’s
request for one dollar in nominal damages effectively protected the suit upon failure
of his request for injunctive and declaratory relief).
143. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489 (characterizing the delegates’ responsibility to
select the Party’s presidential candidate as “a task of supreme importance”).
144. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841-42 (acknowledging the importance of serving as a
delegate, formulating party rules, adopting a party platform, and nominating a
presidential candidate).
145. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (noting that non-judicial branches are best situated
to make preliminary judgments and interpret political questions).
146. See, e.g., Smith v. McQueen, 166 So. 788, 791 (Ala. 1936) (asserting that party
conventions determine party candidates).
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Even a court that rejected the constitutionality of the Equal Division
Rule conceded that internal party requirements of gender-balanced
committees might survive judicial scrutiny for this reason.147
The controversial Presidential elections in November 2000 and the
ensuing political and legal turmoil fail to undermine this analysis.
The implications of the contentious legal wrangling resulting from
the 2000 elections remain unclear;148 in fact, both political parties
geared up for similar battles before, during, and after the 2004
Presidential elections.149 The current Supreme Court majority’s
reverence for state’s rights and federalist principles, however, suggests
the Court’s continued reluctance to intrude into the political
process.150 Furthermore, any challenges to the Equal Division Rule
would implicate non-justiciable internal party decisions, rather than
justiciable state action.151
D. State Action
If, despite the previous analysis, a court finds an Equal Protection
claim justiciable, it must then determine whether the claim involves
state action.152 Constitutional rights such as freedom of association
and equal protection limit only state actors and not private individuals
or entities.153 If political parties are not state actors, then individuals
may not bring constitutional challenges against them, thus precluding
147. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 786 (distinguishing party decisions regarding
delegate selection from party decisions concerning internal committees).
148. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (specifying that the Court’s
reasoning was “limited to the present circumstances” due to the difficulties presented
by the parties’ equal protection challenges to election laws).
149. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Legal Battles Could Cloud Outcome in Swing States,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 2004, at A1 (detailing the plethora of legal challenges to voting
machines, provisional ballots, and voter registration processes in swing states and
parties’ large-scale recruitment of lawyers to monitor voting procedures); Linda
Kleindienst et al., Lawsuits Fly Before Voting Even Starts, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct.
14, 2004, at A1 (“In Florida, presidential elections and lawsuits seem to go together
like peanut butter and jelly.”).
150. See Gregory P. Magarian, How Bush Won, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 8, 2002, at 36
(“[E]ven the rare sympathizers with the majority’s equal protection analysis . . .
acknowledge that the analysis lacked precedential support and sharply violated the
conservative judicial ethos of its five adherents.”). See generally Timothy J. Conlan &
Francosi Vergniolle De Chantal, The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American
Federalism, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 253 (2001) (noting the expansion of state’s rights and
concurrent restriction of Congressional authority under the current Supreme Court).
151. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining judicial reluctance to intrude into
internal party decisions regarding matters within the realm of party authority); see
also discussion infra Part II.D (asserting the dearth of either state actors or state
action in Equal Division Rule processes).
152. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1077 (highlighting courts’ reluctance to identify state
action in political rights cases that do not involve racial discrimination).
153. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (noting the inapplicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment to private acts, regardless of their discriminatory nature).
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the validity of Equal Protection suits targeting the Equal Division
Rule.154
Courts have established that primary elections constitute state
action.155 In Smith v. Allwright, the Court held that party primaries
represent state action because a state statute required parties to
conduct electoral procedures, including primaries.156 In Terry v.
Adams, the Court extended the scope of state action to encompass a
private political association’s pre-primary elections because the
association’s candidates almost invariably received the Democratic
Party nomination.157 Subsequent appellate cases have reinforced the
state action doctrine, concluding that party procedures represent state
action when integrally related to the electoral process.158 Thus,
courts consider political parties state actors when conducting
elections, but view them as private organizations when performing
internal party business.159
Some courts have interpreted the Democratic Party’s
implementation of the Equal Division Rule in primary elections as an
internal party decision, rather than as state action.160 First, voting for
delegates and voting for candidates represent vastly different acts;
while delegates perform party duties such as rule establishment,
platform deliberation, and candidate nomination, their candidate

154. See Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tex. 1997)
(indicating the duality of political parties, which don and cast off state actor status
depending on the nature of their conduct).
155. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding that a private
political association’s primary election constituted state action); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944) (finding party primaries an essential component of the
electoral process, and thus state action).
156. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663-64 (emphasizing that the statutory requirements,
not the party’s performance, rendered the party an agent of the state).
157. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (dismissing the Democratic Party primary and
election as merely “perfunctory ratifiers” of the Jaybird Democratic Association’s
candidate selection).
158. See, e.g., Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, 898 F.2d 1192,
1196 (6th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the election of a party ward chairman did not
represent state action because there was no evidence that chairmen played an
“integral part” in the political appointment process); Kay v. N.H. Democratic Party,
821 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining that a presidential candidate’s forum is
not an integral part of the electoral process and thus did not constitute state action);
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1972)
(invalidating a state statute requiring a weighted voting system for use in internal
party affairs, but requiring equal voting where committee members performed public
duties); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 372 (3d Cir. 1965) (upholding the voting
system for electing party county chairmen).
159. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 92-93 (distinguishing party platforms as beyond
the electoral sphere and thus outside the realm of state action where state election
laws did not mandate or regulate platforms).
160. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (interpreting the Equal Division Rule as an
internal policy to expand women’s participation in party events).
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preference may not become the party’s nominee.161 Alternatively,
courts cannot validly consider delegate selection of a party’s nominee
an “integral part of the electoral process” when the identity of the
victor is a foregone conclusion long before the convention occurs.162
In addition to selecting the party’s presidential nominee, national
convention delegates also influence the rules, platform, and overall
agenda of the party.163 Courts do not consider formation of the party
platform a component of the election process.164 Party candidates
may accept, reject, or completely disregard the party platform, with
no repercussions.165 Delegates’ involvement with the party platform,
an essential element of the delegates’ duties, thus fails to represent
state action.166
Examination of the key players involved in primary elections lends
further credence to the assertion that courts should not view such
events as state action.167 Courts have ruled that presidential electors,
party committee members, national convention delegates, and state
party chairs do not constitute state officers.168 Such individuals
represent party, but not public, officials.169 In summary, interpreting
primary elections as state action regardless of the fact that most, if not
all, of the essential participants fail to constitute state actors and fail to
161. See id. at 841-42 (suggesting that party policies may influence the nominee
selection process).
162. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (identifying state action when party policies
or practices constituted “an integral part of the election process”); see also Joan
Vennochi, Editorial, Hub Must Mend its Conventional Ways, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,
2002, at A19 (criticizing present-day conventions as “totally scripted, no-news-is-goodnews” affairs).
163. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1083 n.30 (describing delegates’ duties at national
conventions).
164. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (positing that the Texas Election Code does
not mandate party platforms). But see MELICH, supra note 58, at 22 (lauding
platforms as blueprints of parties’ “promises and dreams” that “invariably” become
the parties’ agendas).
165. See Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (linking a candidate’s independence regarding
platform provisions with Texas’ failure to require or regulate party platforms).
166. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 601 (Tamm, J., concurring) (reasoning that the
First Amendment protects government infringement of delegates’ duties of platform
adoption, rule formulation, and nominee selection).
167. See, e.g., Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371, 373 (Ga. 1968)
(finding that the state party chair does not constitute a state officer); Sears v. Sec’y of
the Commw., 341 N.E.2d 264, 269 (Mass. 1975) (concluding that party members and
national convention delegates do not represent state officers); Stanford v. Butler, 181
S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944) (holding that presidential electors are not state officers).
168. See id. But see Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 574-76 (suggesting that a national
party’s selection of convention delegates might constitute state action based on
federal funding of national committees, conventions, and primary elections).
169. See, e.g., Morris v. Peters, 46 S.E.2d 729, 734 (Ga. 1948) (noting that statutory
regulation of state party chair responsibilities does not indicate legislative intent to
render the chairman a state actor).
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perform solely state functions is illogical and erroneous.170
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Since Craig v. Boren,171 courts have examined gender
discrimination claims by applying intermediate scrutiny analysis.172
To survive such scrutiny, gender-based classifications must be
“substantially related” to the achievement of “important governmental
objectives.”173 The Supreme Court later amended this standard to
require
“exceedingly
persuasive”
justifications
for
such
174
classifications.
While Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena established that both
invidious and benign racial classifications would receive strict judicial
scrutiny,175 courts have not issued a similar ruling regarding the
proper level of analysis for benign gender classifications.176
According to the logic in Adarand Constructors, Inc., which
emphasized the incompatibility of national ideals of equality and
170. See id. (recognizing general judicial reluctance to identify party officials as
state actors, even where state statutes regulate political parties).
171. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
172. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60-71 (2001) (upholding statute
imposing additional citizenship qualification criteria for children born abroad and
out of wedlock to male American citizens as substantially related to the important
government objectives of confirming the biological relationship between the man
and the child and guaranteeing the opportunity for the parent and child to cultivate
a genuine relationship); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-40 (1996) (concluding
that the Commonwealth of Virginia failed to demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive
justification for excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute). “However
‘liberally’ this plan serves the Commonwealth's sons, it makes no provision whatever
for her daughters. That is not equal protection.” Id. at 540. See also J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994) (prohibiting gender-based
peremptory challenges due to the insufficient relationship between such acts and a
state’s interest in holding fair and impartial trials); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan
458 U.S. 718, 730-31 (1982) (striking a public university’s policy prohibiting males
from enrolling for credit in its nursing school based on the university’s failure to
establish a substantial relationship between the policy and the goal of remedying past
educational discrimination against women). The university also failed to establish an
exceedingly persuasive justification for the gender-based classification. Id. at 731.
173. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 200 (striking down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting
beer sales to men under twenty-one and women under eighteen as insufficiently
related to achievement of its objectives of traffic safety).
174. See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 732 (sustaining the male plaintiff’s
equal protection challenge of a public university’s refusal to permit male students to
enroll for credit in nursing school).
175. See 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (requiring heightened scrutiny of governmentimposed racial classifications to protect the individual right to equal protection
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clauses).
176. See Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender
Affirmative Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada, and the United States:
A Comparative Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 27, 53-54 (2003) (noting that
previous cases, such as United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Nguyen v.
I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), involved invidious gender-based classifications).
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differential race-based treatment,177 courts would likely apply
intermediate scrutiny, presently used to analyze invidious gender
classifications, to benign gender classifications as well.178 Relevant
political party case law, however, fails to substantiate this
hypothesis.179 Courts appear to apply a standard of scrutiny less
rigorous than intermediate scrutiny to such cases, ensuring the
survival of rules requiring gender-balanced party positions.180
Particularly given the judiciary’s hesitance to interfere in political
party matters, equal division rules would likely withstand intermediate
scrutiny analysis.181
A. Gender Based Discrimination Analysis
Equal Protection challenges of the Equal Division Rule brought by
disgruntled voters against the Democratic Party require the latter to
prove that the gender classification is substantially related to an
important party objective.182 The Rule may survive scrutiny even if it
does not further such objectives with every application.183 Remedying
past economic discrimination and encouraging equal employment
opportunity represent permissible bases for gender-based
classifications.184 The Equal Division Rule and gender-balance
cases185 extend this framework to permit compensation of women for
177. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227 (asserting that equal
protection requires identical, stringent analysis of all racial classifications, regardless
of their intent).
178. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (sustaining, under
intermediate scrutiny, a Social Security benefits formula that awarded women higher
monthly benefits than men).
179. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (applying rational basis analysis to uphold the
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule); Ricard, 544 So.2d at 1313-14 (applying
rational basis analysis to uphold Democratic Party Equal Division Rule); Hartman v.
Covert, 696 A.2d 788, 790-91 (N.J. 1997) (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating a
New Jersey statute requiring gender-balanced party leadership); Marchioro, 582 P.2d
at 492 (applying rational basis and intermediate scrutiny analysis to uphold a
Washington statute mandating gender-balanced party committees).
180. See, e.g., Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (requiring rational basis analysis of
delegate allocation formulas).
181. See, e.g., Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 833-34 (asserting that political, rather than
legal, entities are best suited to determine the legitimacy of state delegations).
182. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (introducing such scrutiny, thereafter labeled
“intermediate scrutiny,” as the proper analysis for gender-based classification cases).
183. See Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001)
(qualifying that gender classification equal protection cases do not always require
statutes to achieve the anticipated objective to withstand judicial review).
184. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (positing that the
Virginia Military Institute may not use sex classifications to maintain women’s legal,
social, or economic inferiority).
185. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 837 (challenging the Equal Division Rule as
infringing Party members’ voting rights); Marchioro, 582 P.2d at 489 (asserting that
statutes mandating election of committee members and chairs of opposite sexes
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past political discrimination.186
The Democratic Party adopted the Equal Division Rule not only to
rectify past discrimination against women, but also to encourage
women’s active participation as delegates, committee members, and
party leaders.187 The Party sought to increase women’s presence
within the organization to parallel the proportion of registered female
party members.188 More implicitly, the involvement of diverse
individuals effectively advances Party goals of equality, fairness, and
liberty.189 The Party’s goals constitute important party objectives.190
Courts will likely acquiesce in the use of the Equal Division Rule to
accomplish these objectives because of the direct relationship
between the Rule and its goals.191 In Craig v. Boren, the Court struck
down an Oklahoma statute permitting women, but not men, between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to purchase beer.192 The Court
emphasized the fatally tenuous link between limiting beer sales, but
not consumption, and enhancing traffic safety where young men were
responsible for many traffic violations and accidents.193 In Califano v.
Webster, on the other hand, the Court upheld Social Security benefit
awards calculated using a formula more favorable to female
workers.194 The comparatively advantageous benefits that women
violated the Washington Equal Rights Amendment and the First Amendment).
186. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 839, 842 (recognizing women’s lack of success in
delegate elections and “notably deficient” participation in party affairs before
implementation of the Equal Division Rule). But see Hartman, 696 A.2d at 792
(concluding that federal and state anti-discrimination laws have eliminated the
necessity of statutes mandating gender-balanced party leadership).
187. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 767 (explaining the origins of the Equal Division
Rule). See generally Abzug et al., supra note 53 (tracing women’s participation in the
Democratic Party and Party attempts to increase women’s involvement).
188. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 838 (explaining the motivations behind the
enactment of the Equal Division Rule).
189. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 17 (“At the heart
of our party lies a fundamental conviction, that Americans must not only be free, but
they must live in a fair society.”). The Democratic Party Credo celebrates the ideals of
respect, equality, opportunity, democracy, education, and safety. Id.
190. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1083 n.28 (asserting that advocacy of party beliefs,
nomination of candidates, and recruitment of minorities, women, and youth
constitute permissible party goals).
191. See id.
192. 429 U.S. 190 (1975); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 and Supp.
1976) (barring the sale of “non-intoxicating” beer containing 3.2% alcohol to men
under twenty-one and women under eighteen).
193. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04 (questioning the validity of the gender
classification where statistics revealed that police arrested only two percent of men in
the relevant age group for driving under the influence and where the studies focused
on alcoholic beverages, rather than beer containing 3.2% alcohol).
194. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 314-16 (explaining the formula, which permitted
women to discount three additional low earning years from their benefits
calculations). But see Polelle v. Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 386 F. Supp. 443,
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received attempted to remedy the comparatively disadvantageous
salaries women earned.195 The Equal Division Rule mirrors the
benefit payments upheld in Califano in attempting to remedy past
discrimination.196 The Equal Division Rule, by mandating parity
among delegates at national conventions, will directly increase
women’s party activism and further Party goals of equality.197
The Democratic Party’s exceedingly persuasive justification for the
implementation of the Equal Division Rule derives from the Party’s
desire to remedy its longstanding discrimination against women.198
Previous gender balance attempts fell short of their desired goals, and
Party leadership ranks remained predominantly male, despite the fact
that women accounted for around half of the Party membership and a
majority of the Party’s lower-level staffers.199 In fact, requiring
proportional representation among delegates serves several beneficial
functions beyond remedying past discrimination. First, it provides
women the opportunity to vote for the party’s presidential
nominee.200 Because women are more likely than men to support
women candidates, increasing the proportion of women delegates
may thus increase the proportion of Democratic women
candidates.201 In addition, female delegates and candidates reveal
444 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (noting that despite the differential treatment, men continued to
earn higher monthly benefits than women).
195. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (noting that eradication of economic disparities
between men and women constitutes an “important governmental objective”); see
also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353, 355 (1974) (upholding an annual $500
property tax exemption granted to widows, but not widowers, based on the unique
economic obstacles confronting widows).
196. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 318 (explaining that because past earnings
determine retirement benefit awards, increasing the latter balances out
discriminatory restraints on the former); see also Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (observing
that the Equal Division Rule legitimately redresses previous discrimination at national
conventions by ensuring female participation at such events reflects female party
membership); see also Angela High-Pippert & John Comer, Female Empowerment:
The Influence of Women Representing Women, 19 WOMEN & POL. 53, 60 (1998)
(asserting that when women represent women, women are more likely to vote and
engage in political activities).
197. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 20, 23 (articulating the Democratic Party’s
goal of enhancing women’s participation and representation throughout the
organization).
198. See generally id. (examining the Democratic Party’s poor treatment of
women politically, financially, and organizationally, and summarizing attempts to
redress such conduct and increase women’s participation).
199. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 121 (condemning the entrenched
discrimination, which restricted women to “making coffee but not policy”); see also
WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 27 (crediting female volunteers as the “grassroots
backbone” of both major parties, while noting their exclusion from influential
positions).
200. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90 (touting the selection of parties’ Presidential
and Vice Presidential candidates as “a task of supreme importance”).
201. See Niven, supra note 124, at 69, 72 (finding that chairwomen demonstrated
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distinct policy priorities and would thus broaden the Party’s agenda to
include health care, social service, family, and education issues.202
Finally, the increased proportion of female delegates will encourage
other women to become more politically active.203
B. Affirmative Action Analysis
In general, judicial disapproval of affirmative action measures
focuses on practices that create invidious rather than benign
discrimination.204 On the whole, courts disapprove of quotas,
Courts
preferring flexibility over rigid numerical formulas.205
exercise greater lenience when reviewing voluntarily implemented
affirmative action programs.206 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the
a greater inclination than chairmen to perceive female candidates as likely to succeed
and thus worthy of endorsement).
202. See generally Susan J. Carroll, The Politics of Difference: Women Public
Officials as Agents of Change, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 12-13 (1994) (finding that
in the 103d Congress, Congresswomen were more inclined than Congressmen to
support policies concerning families, health care, and education); Julie Dolan,
Support for Women’s Interests in the 103rd Congress: The Distinct Impact of
Congressional Women, 18 WOMEN & POL. 81, 89 (1997) (finding that
Congresswomen are more prone than Congressmen to support women’s interests);
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Elected to Lead: A Challenge to Women in Public Office, in
THE DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 109, 118 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2003) (attributing the responsibility for legislation regarding family leave,
pregnancy discrimination, child support enforcement, and breast and cervical cancer
to female House members); Thomas H. Little et al., A View from the Top: Gender
Differences in Legislative Priorities Among State Legislative Leaders, 22 WOMEN &
POL. 29, 44 (2001) (revealing that female state legislators tend to prioritize health
care, family issues, and social services more than their male colleagues); Mark J.
Rozell & Clyde Wilcox, A GOP Gender Gap? Motivations, Policy, and Candidate
Choice, 19 WOMEN & POL. 91, 98 (1998) (finding that female Republican delegates
are more liberal than their fellow male delegates on gender and sexual orientation
issues, but are more conservative regarding education and pornography).
203. See Pippert & Comer, supra note 196, at 60, 62 (stating that women
represented by women tend to be more politically involved, adept, and
knowledgeable than women represented by men).
204. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (noting that plaintiffs
may establish their equal protection claim by linking the “invidious quality” of the law
at issue to a racially discriminatory purpose); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S.
256, 274 (1979) (establishing that the Court may strike down neutral classifications if
the statute’s effect reveals invidious gender discrimination). But see Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking an admissions policy that granted
additional points to minority applicants to achieve a diverse student body).
205. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (rejecting an admissions formula that granted
twenty points based on race where the points usually guaranteed the admission of
minority applicants). But see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 177-78
(1987) (permitting a system in which black employees received half of the
promotions awarded); United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208 (upholding a program
reserving half of the spots in an internal training program for black employees). See
generally Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1073-80 (Cal. 2000)
(tracing the judicial transition from steadfast opposition to gradual acceptance of
benign discrimination measures).
206. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987)
(acknowledging judicial and legislative praise of voluntary action taken to ensure non-
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Equal Division Rule would survive affirmative action analysis based on
its strict numerical standards,207 its indefiniteness,208 and, arguably, its
present lack of necessity.209
When examining affirmative action programs, courts consider the
purpose of the program, the conditions under which the program is
implemented, the interests of the affected groups, and the duration of
the program.210 Courts also scrutinize the availability of alternative
remedies, the necessity for relief, the flexibility of the program, and
the relationship of any numerical goals to the applicable market.211
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court proved receptive to
the Transportation Agency’s affirmative action plan due to its
voluntary adoption, its consideration of gender as one of many
relevant factors, its short-term goal of attaining a more genderbalanced labor force, its flexibility, and its negligible effect on third
parties.212
Similarly, courts would approve of the voluntary establishment of
the Equal Division Rule after the failure of alternative strategies to
increase women’s political participation.213 In addition, courts would
discrimination); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)
(chastising Respondent’s failure to acknowledge the organization’s unilateral
decision to implement affirmative action measures to eradicate race discrimination);
see also Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1994) (“Voluntary affirmative action to
improve the opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and
protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII.”).
207. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (rejecting an admissions point system
because the additional points automatically granted to minority applicants precluded
examination of applicants’ experiences and ability to enhance student body
diversity).
208. See Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 759 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (warning that
quotas lacking a specified end date may become outdated because they may extend
past the time for which they are justified).
209. Cf. id. at 758 (noting that women’s participation as candidates in the county
judicial nominating commission increased as the percentage of women lawyers in the
county increased).
210. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 197-98, 208 (upholding an
affirmative action plan implemented to eradicate a racially imbalanced workforce
where the plan was adopted pursuant to collective bargaining procedures, permitted
white and black workers to attend the craft training program, and was intended as a
temporary mechanism).
211. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (permitting an affirmative action plan that
mandated the promotion of equal numbers of white and black workers where other
proposed remedies failed to address persistent discrimination, the program was
necessary to eradicate discrimination and spur compliance, the program was
adaptable, the program appropriately reflected the racial composition of the
workforce, and the program did not unduly burden white applicants).
212. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-42 (emphasizing the program’s establishment to
combat women’s under-representation in certain positions, incorporation of labor
force factors into formation of appropriate goals, and emphasis on the qualifications
of all applicants, regardless of gender).
213. See Harvey, supra note 50, at 92-94 (detailing the Democratic and Republican
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favorably perceive the direct relationship between the Rule’s goal of
parity in leadership, committee, and delegate positions and women’s
proportionate representation in the Party’s electoral base.214
However, courts would disapprove of the Rule’s strict gender-balance
requirements, questioning the continued need for the Rule given
women’s political gains over the past two decades.215 The indefinite
tenure of the Rule would also attract judicial notice.216 Although the
Democratic Party could note that Party Charter amendment policies
provide for removal of unwanted provisions, this argument will carry
little weight due to the relatively onerous task of winning the required
votes for such a change.217 On the whole, affirmative action
jurisprudence fails to support the establishment of gender balance
rules.
CONCLUSION
Legal analysis of the Equal Division Rule demonstrates the necessity
of relying on gender-based classification arguments, rather than
affirmative action logic, to successfully withstand judicial scrutiny.218
Proponents should emphasize that the Equal Division Rule does not
infringe freedom of association or voting rights.219 In fact, parties’
delegate selection methods represent non-justiciable political

Parties’ lax enforcement of targeted recruitment efforts).
214. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 20 (asserting that the Party’s affirmative
action measures apply to all state parties and at all levels of the party hierarchy).
215. See Marie Cocco, Editorial, A Symbolic Candidate Does NOW Little Good,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 2003, at A35 (noting women’s appointments as cabinet secretaries
and election as governors, senators, and state officials since 1984); Connie Lauerman,
Against Great Odds, a Run for the White House: Moseley-Braun’s Campaign Puts Her
in Select Company, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003, at C1 (recounting the female
presidential candidates since Victoria Chalfin Woodhull in 1872, including Shirley
Chisholm, Lenora Fulani, Patsy Mink, and Elizabeth Dole); Liz Marlantes, She’s Not a
Candidate . . . Probably, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2003, at 1 (reporting
speculation regarding Senator Hillary Clinton’s presidential chances in the 2004
elections).
216. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 772 (noting that the Democratic Party Charter,
which includes provisions similar to the Equal Division Rule, “remains effective and
binding on the Party”).
217. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. X, § 1 (delineating the
Charter’s amendment procedure, which may occur by majority vote of all delegates to
the National Convention, pending ratification by a majority of National Committee
membership; a two-thirds vote of the entire committee membership; or a two-thirds
vote of the Party Conference membership).
218. See supra notes 171-217 and accompanying text (contrasting judicial
acceptance of gender-balance rules to remedy past discrimination with judicial
rejection of fixed quotas established for an indefinite duration).
219. See supra notes 71-118 and accompanying text (concluding that political
parties’ expansive associational freedoms encompass party control over candidate
selection procedures).
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questions inappropriate for judicial intervention.220 Even if a court
finds such a claim justiciable, the dearth of state actors will preclude
judicial condemnation of the Rule.221 Such arguments, however, do
not ensure the Rule’s survival, given the increasingly conservative
composition of the federal courts222 and the corresponding
willingness to strike affirmative action policies as overbroad.223
The Equal Division Rule enhances the diversity of members and
perspectives among Party membership and elites.224 In the context of
the worldwide gender quota movement, such rules provide the most
realistic option for enhancing women’s political participation in
United States. The American electoral system is ill-equipped for the
establishment of a gender quota law for national office.225
Furthermore, the controversy surrounding such legislation, as well as
the desire of the predominantly male Congress to protect their
electoral opportunities, would discourage many legislators from
approving such a law.226 In addition, gender quota laws do not
guarantee women’s electoral success, as demonstrated by the failure
of the French parity law in the 2002 National Assembly elections.227
The Equal Division Rule, however, successfully targets grassroots
political participation in party conventions.228 The Rule encourages
220. See supra notes 119-151 and accompanying text (finding political parties best
suited to resolve delegate selection disputes, and noting the difficulty of fashioning
relief in such matters).
221. See supra notes 152-170 and accompanying text (characterizing the Equal
Division Rule as an internal party decision rather than state action and observing that
most party leaders involved in primary elections do not constitute state actors).
222. See Deborah Sontag, The Intellectual Heart of Conservative America, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 40 (reporting that President Bush’s judicial nominees
will exacerbate the conservative tilt of the federal courts initially established under
Presidents Reagan and Bush, Sr.).
223. See David A. Strauss, Editorial, Affirmative Action: A Conservative Victory,
CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2003, at 27 (contending that the Supreme Court rulings in the
Michigan affirmative action cases represented exceedingly conservative ideology and
lacked a coherent legal basis).
224. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 24 (positing the expected consequences of
the Equal Division Rule as an increase in the Party’s accessibility for, responsiveness
to, and representation of the Party constituency, and women in particular).
225. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 208 (contending that party list proportional
representation electoral systems prove most amenable to implementation of gender
quotas).
226. See generally JOHN M. CAREY, TERM LIMITS AND LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION
(Cambridge U. Press 1996) (articulating the significance of election to political office,
even for politicians confronting term limits).
227. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 196 (attributing women’s minimal political
increases to loopholes in the parity law that permitted parties to run women in
hopeless districts and that provided parties funding even if they disregarded the parity
requirement).
228. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (mandating
gender-balanced state delegations at national conventions).
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political activism at local and state levels, permitting women to gain
political experience and expertise and develop personal political
Indeed, since 1972, the proportion of female
aspirations.229
Democratic delegates has consistently exceeded that of female
Republican delegates.230 The Democratic Party also boasts a higher
percentage of female legislators, despite the current Republican
Congressional majority.231 The Equal Division Rule, then, provides
balanced representation and creates realistic opportunities for women
to ascend the political hierarchy.

229. See Georgia Duerst-Lahti, The Bottleneck: Women Becoming Candidates, in
WOMEN AND ELECTIVE OFFICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15, 20-21 (Sue Thomas &
Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998) (identifying civic experience as an important characteristic
for an aspiring candidate).
230. See generally BECK & SORAUF, supra note 61, at 286 (listing the percentage of
female delegates between 1968 and 1988); Jo Freeman, Feminist Activities at the 1988
Republican Convention (reporting that women accounted for approximately thirtyfive percent of the Republican delegates at the 1988 convention), available at
http://jofreeman.com/conventions/repub88.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo
Freeman, Women at the 1988 Democratic Convention (recording approximately fifty
percent female Democratic delegates at the 1988 convention), available at http://
jofreeman.com/conventions/dem88.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman,
Feminism vs. Family Values: Women at the 1992 Democratic and Republican
Conventions (stating that women represented fifty percent of the Democratic
delegates and approximately forty-two percent of the Republican delegates at the
1992
conventions),
available
at
http://jofreeman.com/conventions/1992
conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman, Change and Continuity for
Women at the 1996 Republican and Democratic Conventions (observing that women
accounted for fifty percent of the Democratic delegates and thirty-four percent of the
Republican delegates at the 1996 conventions), available at http://jofreeman.com/
conventions/1996conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman, Lots of Show
but Little Substance at the 2000 Republican and Democratic Conventions (estimating
female delegates’ attendance rates at approximately fifty percent at the Democratic
convention and thirty-five percent at the Republican convention in 2000), available at
http://jofreeman.com/conventions/2000conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005);
Ann McFeatters, Political Parties Work to Put Pizazz in Conventions, PITT. POSTGAZETTE, July 14, 2004, at A11 (reporting that women represented half of the
delegates at the 2004 Democratic convention); 2004 Republican National Convention
(asserting that women accounted for forty-four percent of the delegates at the 2004
Republican convention), available at http://www.gopconvention.com/contents/
delegates/diversity/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
231. See Center for American Women and Politics, Women in Elected Office 2005
Fact Sheet Summaries (calculating fourteen female Senators, including nine
Democrats and five Republicans, and sixty-six Representatives, including forty-three
Democrats and twenty-three Republicans), available at http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/
Facts/Officeholders/cawpfs.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
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